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I. INTRODUCTION: A NEW ARCTIC OCEAN SECURITY AGENDA
The Obama administration seeks to push the "reset" button on
Washington-Moscow relations. Military-to-military programs between the
United States and Russia, which were suspended after the August 2008
conflict in Georgia, have resumed and included nearly twenty (20)
exchanges and operational events in 2009.1 The President rescinded plans
to install ballistic missile defense sites in Eastern Europe, which Moscow
applauded. NATO is also seeking closer cooperation with Russia. On
September 18, 2009, NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen
called for a "new beginning" in relations between the Alliance and
Moscow, focusing practical cooperation and conducting a joint review of
new security challenges.2
* Commander Kraska is the Howard S. Levie Chair of Operational Law and professor of
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at the American Branch of the International Law Association "ILA Weekend" in New York in
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1. Carlos Aranga, US.-Russian Military-to-Military Links Set to Expand, EMBASSY OF THE
U.S. LONDON UK, Sept. 21, 2009, available at http://www.usembassy.org.uk/euro030.html#top (last
visited Feb. 25, 2010).
2. Id.
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Following President Barack Obama's visit to Russia, the presidents of
the two nations created a Bilateral Presidential Commission, which they
will co-chair. The Commission is designed to move bilateral relations
beyond "Cold War mentalities and chart a fresh start in relations between
our two countries."3  Secretary of State Clinton and Foreign Minister
Lavrov will coordinate the Commission, which will include working groups
on foreign policy, military-to-military cooperation, counter-terrorism,
nuclear energy and security, arms control, and other bilateral issues.4 The
co-chairs pledged to develop an initial list of priority initiatives and a
roadmap for moving forward. In conjunction with the military-to-military
cooperation, the Commission should also establish a working group on
Arctic security. Increased maritime security collaboration in the Arctic
Ocean offers one of the best opportunities to develop common bilateral
interests in the security relationship that are largely unencumbered by past
political differences.
The Arctic is a maritime domain, and if we are to look forward to new
maritime security cooperation, we would do well to consider past
collaboration. First, this paper traces bilateral collaboration between
Moscow and Washington during the negotiations for the Law of the Sea
Convention. Complementary interests in freedom of the seas made the
Soviet Union and the United States natural allies in negotiating the
Convention, but the spirit of cooperation was lost after the treaty was
completed, and it never has been regained. Over the past decade, U.S.-
Russian maritime security relations deteriorated, smothered by larger
disputes. Yet while Russian Arctic diplomacy occasionally has become
belligerent, Moscow has tacked quite close to adhering to international law
in its activities in the Arctic-paying particular attention to compliance
with the Law of the Sea Convention. This serves as a solid basis for
exploring closer maritime security cooperation in the Arctic Ocean by
providing a common rule set for the four areas ripe for greater
collaboration. Next, the paper turns toward the public statements of the two
nations concerning the Arctic. Both the United States and Russia have
recently released Arctic strategies, which suggest broad areas of interest and
concern in Arctic security, as well as raise opportunities for conducting
combined maritime training, naval exercises, and military operations in the
Arctic Ocean.
Third, the paper proposes areas of potential collaboration. In light of
the shared concerns between the two nations, the United States should
3. Bilateral Presidential Commission, 15 Oct. 2009, available at
http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/130616.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2010).
4. Aranga, supra note i.
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propose an agenda of four areas to serve as a term of reference for the
proposed Arctic Working Group of the Bilateral Presidential Commission.
Each of these areas relates to a more collaborative approach to sea power in
the Arctic Ocean, and therefore is broadly supportive of the Department of
Defense goal of fashioning a cooperative approach to 21st century sea
power.
II. THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP
The basic governing framework for the Arctic Ocean is already
established--the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS).5 Not only is Moscow a party to UNCLOS, but it has been
fairly straightforward in its compliance with the treaty, pursuing its interests
in the Arctic within the accepted framework of the Convention. Moscow
largely plays by the rules applicable to the Arctic Ocean, and this
compliance provides a basis for greater collaboration on Arctic security.
The United States, on the other hand, should join the treaty in order to
assume a more influential role in the Arctic Ocean and around the world.
Ironically, although the United States is not a party to UNCLOS, it was one
of the primary negotiators of the pact, which is accepted by more than 150
states and has assumed its place as the constitution for the world's oceans.
Although the United States is a traditional maritime power and Russia
the quintessential land power, the two countries have long shared a natural
union of strategic interests at sea. During the negotiations for the Law of
the Sea Convention from 1973-1982, for example, Russia and the United
States were the core members of the group of five major maritime powers
that ensured that the new treaty protected and promoted freedom of
navigation and global mobility.6 Lobbying their friends and client states at
the height of the Cold War, the two superpowers developed generous
navigational regimes now codified in the Convention that protect
commercial and military access throughout the oceans. The U.S.S.R., for
example, stood with the Western major maritime states and Japan in
conditioning acceptance of the 200-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ)
upon guarantees for the right of foreign-flagged vessels, including warships,
to navigate and conduct all non-resource-related activities in the zone.7
5. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 396-7
[hereinafter Law of the Sea].
6. ANN L. HOLLICK, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 253 (Princeton Univ.
Press) (1981). The other four major maritime powers were the United States, United Kingdom, France
and Japan.
7. Id. at 294.
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At the Caracas Session of the Law of the Sea negotiations in 1974, the
U.S.S.R. combined with Denmark, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland,
to propose that marine scientific research in coastal areas would not be
subject to coastal state permission unless it was directed at the exploitation
of resources.8 Although this provision failed to gain acceptance by the
greater conference, it demonstrated Russia's commitment to the concept of
freedom of the seas.
Similarly, with visions of a blue water fleet under Admiral of the Fleet
S. G. Gorshkov, and more importantly, trapped in geographic disadvantage,
with all of its ports zone-locked by other coastal states' territorial seas and
EEZs, Russia proved an essential ally for obtaining the right of unimpeded
transit through international straits. Washington and Moscow--one
democratic and the other communist-achieved a regime of freedom of
navigation throughout the littorals and championed the right of unimpeded
transit through strategic chokepoints. 9
The close maritime relationship between Washington and Moscow did
not survive beyond the Cold War. In the 1990s, the United States acquired
the mantle of a unipolar power, believing that a weakened Russia was less
critical to maintaining the navigational regimes reflected in the Convention.
Furthermore, U.S. national concern over strategic security in the oceans
waned, yielding to a vision of the oceans that valued environmental
protection over global mobility. After the attacks of 9/11, maritime
homeland security rose to the top of the U.S. oceans agenda, and
Washington began to promote electronic systems for maritime domain
awareness that enable coastal states to track-and potentially impede-
offshore navigation.
As these trends in oceans policy were developing, Vladimir Putin rose
to power in Russia. Relations between the West and Russia deteriorated,
and Moscow's diplomatic bellicosity and bluster have increased. These
changes emerge from a period of missed opportunity in bilateral diplomacy.
There is no doubt that Washington and Moscow have experienced some
rather disquieting political and military differences over the past decade.
In the past two decades of American unilateralism by Democratic and
Republican administrations before and following 9/11, Washington
neglected to cultivate a stronger diplomatic relationship with Russia.'0
While Russia's combat operations in the Chechnya wars were excessively
8. Id. at 298.
9. Id. at 253.
10. John Lewis Gaddis, And Now This: Lessons from the Old Era for the New One, in THE
AGE OF TERROR: AMERICA AND THE WORLD AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, 13 (Strobe Talbott and Nayan
Chanda eds., 2001).
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brutal, for example, the Kremlin believes the West did little to support
Moscow against militant secessionist Islam. The overall deterioration in the
relationship between the United States and Russia coincided with a program
of NATO expansion, seemingly designed to make a final adjustment to
European spheres of influence that were unfavorable to Moscow. The
period also gave rise to amazing technological progress on ballistic missile
defense by the United States, which appeared in Moscow to undermine the
potency of Russia's only element of great power status-its nuclear arsenal.
Furthermore, from a Russian viewpoint, the United States demonstrated an
unwillingness to engage with the Kremlin as an equal partner--expecting
cooperation on threat reduction, counter-terrorism, and non-proliferation,
while ignoring Russia's need for a sense of stability and influence in its
"near abroad."
Russia shoulders even greater blame. Last winter Russia returned to a
policy of using energy as a weapon to bully the Ukraine and the states of
Europe. Russia's invasion of its neighbor, Georgia, converted an
inconsequential neighborhood spat into a crisis on the global level. The
invasion was presaged by a stubborn refusal to abide by the Istanbul
commitments to withdraw Russian military forces from Georgia and
Moldova under the Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) framework. Russia
has compensated for a declining military force structure and atrophied
capability with increasingly bellicose diplomacy and provocative military
exercises, unnecessarily antagonizing its most prosperous neighbors and
strongest potential new partners. At the same time, Moscow is courting a
rogues' gallery of nations that are intent on upending the world system.
These maneuvers are driven by a desire to consolidate political power
inside the Kremlin and nurture the political right that is ascending in the
country, but their effects reverberate beyond Russia's borders.
For Moscow, things often are seen through the lens of history. At a
conference on maritime security in a Nordic capital in 2007, I heard a senior
Russian diplomat explain that there were three causes of insecurity in the
Baltic Sea, none of which had anything to do with the Baltic Sea. The three
factors suggested by the representative of the Russian Federation, were:
first, expansion of NATO eastward; second, proposed U.S. missile defense
sites in Poland; and third, the Czech Republic and U.S. noncompliance with
conventional force limits under the CFE treaty, with this third factor being
particularly ironic in light of Russia's unwillingness to comply with its
obligations to remove garrisoned forces from its two neighbors. This
quixotic list underscores Russia's belief that its ability to protect its core
security interests in Eastern Europe, and its identity as a world power, is
dissolving. Russia's concerns are a function of a sense of deep
unsettlement following the dissolution of the U.S.S.R., against the backdrop
2010]
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of an elusive project unfolding for more than half a millennia to catch up to
the West, both technologically and economically. The feelings are
exacerbated by an unhealthy population demographic in free-fall and an
economy wholly dependent on natural resources.
However, throughout Eurasia, Russia is a world-class military power.
Russia can project great military power in the Northern Pacific Ocean, the
Baltic Sea, the Mediterranean and Black Seas, and soon-the Arctic Ocean.
Reconciling a powerful Russia into a peaceful and liberal European order
will take deft diplomacy, and some new approaches to find common
ground. Just as George Kennan predicted that a patient, long-term
containment would serve as a bulwark against an irascible Soviet Union,
persistent promotion of the rule of law in international diplomacy can help
to integrate Russia into the community of nations-and perhaps into the
community of democracies.
Russia will not be satisfied being a junior partner. At the same time
that Russia's national power is cast into question, with a deteriorating stable
of human capital, a "robber baron" feudal economy, and an uneven military
force, we are witnessing an explosion of Russian capabilities and presence
in all spheres of Arctic power. Moscow's preponderance of Arctic power-
geographic, demographic, military, and economic-makes it more
comfortable in negotiating about the Arctic than it is about most other
issues. That same power also makes it imperative for all seven other Arctic
and Arctic-associated nations to work more closely with Moscow to avoid
conflict and ensure prosperity in the High North. As a superpower and ally
or friend of all of the remaining Arctic states, the United States could play a
more constructive role in integrating Russia into a stable new political order
in the Arctic Ocean.
III. ARCTIC RESOURCE ECONOMICS
Not only is Moscow more confident about the Arctic than any other
aspect of national power, but it is also the most self-assured about its role in
the Arctic region than is any other nation. Geographically, Russia is an
immense Arctic nation, stretching 170 degrees around the North Pole. One-
third of Russian territory lies north of the Arctic Circle, and the Northern
Sea Route links these areas to Europe, Asia, and North America. Seventy-
two (72) percent of the world's population living north of the Arctic Circle
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is in Russia." Russia obtains eleven (11) percent of its GDP from the
Arctic, 12 and twenty-two (22) percent of growth in GDP from the Arctic. 13
The Arctic is on the cusp of an economic boom, with Moscow leading
the way. The region is also linked to the national, and indeed, the world
commodity markets. The Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal found that the
Arctic may contain up to 90 billion barrels of oil and 47 trillion cubic meter
of natural gas.' 4 The United States Geological Survey estimated in 2008
that the Arctic holds about thirteen (13) percent of the world's undiscovered
oil, thirty (30) percent of the undiscovered natural gas and twenty (20)
percent of the undiscovered natural gas liquids.' 5 Most of the fossil fuels in
the Arctic are in Russia or areas of the Arctic Ocean under Russian resource
jurisdiction. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev calls reliance on oil and
gas a national narcotic that ameliorates the need for economic reform. 6
Russia has a preponderance of other Arctic resources as well. The
largest nickel mine in the world, for example, is located in the area and
operated by Norilsk. In fact, Russian energy resources in the Arctic dwarf
not just any other nation, but all other Arctic nations combined.
The United States also has significant onshore and offshore
hydrocarbon deposits in the Arctic. 17 The world's largest coal deposit lies
inland along the northwest coast of Alaska.' 8 The world's largest zinc mine
11. GtRARD DUHAIME, & ANDREE CARON, The Economy of the North, in THE ECONOMY OF
THE NORTH 16-25 (Solveig Glomsrbd and Lulie Aslaksen eds., 2006), available at
http://portal.sdwg.org/media.php?mid=454 (last visited Feb. 25, 2010).
12. Gerard Duhaime and Andree Caron, The economy of the circumpolar Arctic, in THE AGE
OF TERROR: AMERICA AND THE WORLD AFTER SEPTEMBER 17, 20 (Strobe Talbott and Nayan Chanda
eds., 2001).
13. Yuri Solozobov, Escalating tensions over hunt for oil and gas in the Artic, RUSSIA Now
(Russ.), Aug. 28, 2009, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sponsored/russianow/6098600/
Escalating-tensions-over-hunt-for-oil-and-gas-in-the-Arctic-Russia-Now.html (last visited Feb. 25,
2010).
14. 90 Billion Barrels of Oil and 1,670 Trillion Cubic Feet of Natural Gas Assessed in the
Arctic, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, May 23, 2008, available at
http://www.usgs.gov/newsroomlarticle.asp?ID=1980&from=rsshome (last visited February 25, 2010)
[hereinafter 90 Billion Barrels]; see also, Jad Mouawad, Oil Survey Says Arctic Has Riches, NEW YORK
TIMES, Jul. 24, 2008 at C1, C4.
15. 90 Billion Barrels, supra note 14.
16. Interview by Georg Mascolo, Chrstian, and Matthias Schepp with Dmitry Medvedev Der,
Russian President, in Russ. (Nov. 9, 2009), available at
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,druck-660114,00.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2010).
17. Sandra Cavalieri, Offshore Hydrocarbon, in ARCTIC TRANSFORM, available at
http://arctictransform.org/download/OffHydSum.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2010).
18. RADM Arthur E. (Gene) Brooks, Arctic Journal - Part I, USCG: COAST GuARD
JOURNAL, Apr. 7,2008, http://www.uscg.mil/cgjournal/message.asp?id=65 (last visited Feb. 25, 2010).
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is located at Red Dog, near the Chukchi Sea.' 9 Consequently, Moscow and
Washington share compelling strategic economic security considerations in
the Arctic, and the area offers a new opportunity for the two nations to
collaborate. Right now the key to unlocking a genuinely constructive
bilateral relationship between Washington and Moscow is to develop a
closer relationship in maritime security cooperation, and the Arctic Ocean is
the best theater for expanding the relationship.
IV. Moscow's MIXED MESSAGES
The Russian Federation has a penchant for spoiling closer relations
with the West. For example, in 2009 Russian diplomats complained about
NATO military exercises in Norway. 20 Andrei Nesterenko of the Russian
Foreign Ministry warned that increased NATO activities in the Arctic might
"erode constructive cooperation" among the nations of the frozen littoral.21
Continuing to stir the pot, on the 70th anniversary of the invasion of
Poland, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Andrei Nesterenko
defended the Soviet Union's 1939 pre-war diplomacy with Nazi Germany,
in which Moscow and Berlin entered into a secret protocol to the Molotov-
Ribbentrop pact to divide Northern and Eastern Europe into spheres of
influence. 2 Nesterenko rejected the fact of this conspiracy between Stalin
and Hitler as "preposterous, to say the least., 23 He continued, suggesting
that recognition of such claims "are an insult to Russia ... and betray a
desire to shift the blame for unleashing the conflict onto somebody else, to
revise World War II history, to discredit Russia, to diminish its role in the
defeat of fascism and to veil their own unseemly behavior before and during
the war at the same time. 24
In 2007 Moscow renewed long-range "Bear" strategic reconnaissance
flights over the Arctic after a fifteen (15) year suspension-raising hackles
in Canada and Norway. Canada has publicly denounced the flights, and
Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Lawrence Cannon wants Moscow to
give advance notice of future flights that are in close proximity to the
19. Id.
20. Vladimir Isachenkov, Russia Plans to Create Arctic Military Force, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Russ.), Mar. 27, 2009, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/03/27/russia-to-create-arctic-
m_n_180157.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2010).
21. Id.
22. Russian foreign ministry spokesman's weekly briefing, BBC MONITORING FORMER SOVIET
UNION (Lon.), Sep. 7, 2009.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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Canadian Arctic Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ).25 When a flight
was conducted a few hundred kilometers north of Canada in February 2009;
on the eve of a visit by President Obama to Ottawa, the Canadian Prime
Minister Stephen Harper and Defense Minister Peter McKay accused
Moscow of trying to bully Canada.26 After discussing the issue with
Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov, Cannon could not resist announcing: "I
do sometimes wonder why the Russians would want to spend so much fuel
to fly up to our borders, and they do the same thing with the Americans so,
anyway, I don't have an answer on that.2 7
Unhelpfully, Ottawa insisted Moscow should provide advance
notification of such flights, even though they are conducted in international
airspace. Russia's ambassador to Canada stated Moscow is "growing weary
of sniping" by Canadian cabinet ministers over what they see as
provocative language about entirely lawful and routine Bear reconnaissance
flights.28  Russian Ambassador Georgiy Mamedov called the Canadian
protest a "bizarre outburst,, 29 and Anatoliy Serdyukov, the Minister of
Defense of the Russian Federation, stated that the suggestion that the
February 2009 flight during Obama's visit to Ottawa was a deliberate
attempt to threaten the newly-elected president of the United States was
"beyond ridiculous. 3 "It is," he continued, "false and nonsensical. 31
Russia is correct in defending its right to conduct the surveillance
flights in international airspace. The flights do not require notification to
nearby nations, and Serdyukov claimed they were "no more provocative
than the ones Canada participates in with NATO, which are much closer to
the Russian border in the Baltic Sea region. 32  Russia proposed an
agreement with Canada whereby Russia would notify Canada of flights in
the Arctic in exchange for notification to Moscow of similar NATO
exercises, which was rejected.33 Furthermore, such a pact would erode
25. Mike Blanchfield, Russia, Canada relations over Arctic remain frosty, CANWEST NEWS
SERVICE (Ottawa), Apr. 9, 2009, available at
http://www.canada.com/news/Russia+Canada+relations+over+Arctic+remain+frosty/1 482408/story.htm
1 (Feb. 25, 2010).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Anatoliy Serdyukov, Don't Demonize Russia, NATIONAL POST (Can.), Mar. 30, 2009, at
A15.
31. Id.
32. Blanchfield, supra note 25.
33. Id.
2010]
526 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law
political support for the United States and allied surveillance and
reconnaissance flights in international airspace throughout the world, such
as off the coast of China.
This issue of Russian over-flights and Canada's hyperventilated
reaction to them raises an issue about the nature of U.S. diplomatic
responses to Russian activities in the Arctic. Both Canada and Norway
have worked to color Russian activities in a way that might leverage
American military power to resist what they view as Russian encroachment
in their locality of the Arctic. For Canada, the concern is Russian
continental shelf claims over the underwater Lomonosov Ridge and the
seabed of the North Pole.
Norway is more anxious to gain recognition for its contested claim of
an EEZ in the waters surrounding the Spitsbergen archipelago. Under the
Svalbard Treaty, Norway has sovereign rights over the islands, but other
nations are free to use the islands as well.34 In 2005, tensions rose when
Norwegian enforcement vessels chased the Russian vessel Elektron out of
the waters near Svalbard. 35 The 1926 treaty predates creation of the concept
of a 200-mile EEZ, however, yet Oslo insists on treating the waters around
the islands as a "Fisheries Protection Zone," an ad hoc term not found in
UNCLOS. But Norway is a maritime nation, with sea area under
jurisdiction that is six (6) times the amount of land territory. 36 Especially
sensitive to displays of naval power, Norway was incensed two years after
the Elektron incident when Russia deployed the aircraft carrier Kuznetzov to
operate near Oslo's most productive offshore oilrigs.37
In neither case, however, is it clear that U.S. allies have a stronger
legal claim than that of Russia. Washington should avoid being drawn into
the squabbles by refraining from automatically supporting Ottawa and Oslo.
It is wrong to assume that the Russian Federation is over-reaching in either
case; in fact, the contrary is true, as Russia has colorable claims to an
extended continental shelf that very well may extend to the North Pole by
way of the Lomonosov Ridge, and a purely textual analysis of the Svalbard
34. Status of Spitsbergen, Feb. 9, 1920, 2 U.S.T. 269, 270 [hereinafter Spitsbergen].
35. Operation Underway to Slop Russian Trawler in Norway, DAILY NEWS BULLETIN
(Moscow), Oct. 17, 2005 at 1.
36. OYSTEIN JENSEN, COASTAL STATE JURISDICTION AND VESSEL SOURCE POLLUTION: THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA FRAMEWORK FOR NORWEGIAN LEGISLATION 2 (Fridtjof Nansen
Institute Report) 2006.
37. Kristian Atland & Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, When Security Speech Acts Misfire: Russia
and the Elektron Incident, 40(3) SECURITY DIALOGUE 333 (2009); Harald S. Klungtveit, Russian
Fighter Planes make Chaos in the North Sea, DAGBLADET.NO, Nov. 12, 2007, available at
http://www.dagbladet.no/nyheter/2007/12/i1/520859.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2010).
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Treaty suggests Norway is not entitled to an economic zone or special
fishing zone surrounding Spitsbergen.
3 8
Ultimately, Greenland (Denmark) may have a greater claim to the
seabed of the North Pole than either Canada or Russia. Greenland has a
tiny population of only 55,000, but the land area is three times the size of
Texas.39 Dependent on funding from Copenhagen, in the coming decades
Greenland is likely to seek independence, replacing Danish subsidies with
revenue from Arctic resources. If this occurs, we can expect China, which
has been cementing agreements for oil and gas around the world, to court
Greenland with wads of cash.
The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf should address
the disagreements over the Lomonosov Ridge claim through careful review,
and the issue concerning an economic zone around Spitsbergen could be
addressed through the dispute resolution machinery in the Law of the Sea
Convention. By developing closer maritime security cooperation with
Russia, the United States may be able to serve a broader and more
constructive mediating role to bring the three other Arctic powers closer
together. Simply supporting Canada and Norway only enforces Russia's
sense of victimhood and isolation, while at the same time cynically
dispensing with governance by the rule of law in favor of a misguided
attempt to employ realpolitik in support of traditional allies.
V. Moscow's ARCTIC STRATEGY
The point of departure for engagement with Moscow on the Arctic
should be a better understanding of the strategic implications of two major
policy pronouncements by the Kremlin-the national security strategy and
the national Arctic strategy. On May 13, 2009, Russian President Dmitriy
Medvedev approved the final National Security Strategy of the Russian
Federation until 2020.40 The new approach emphasizes the economic
component of national power. The goal of the document is the public
security of the state and the "preservation of the constitutional order and
sovereignty of the Russian Federation. 'A The strategy targets the United
38. Spitsbergen, supra note 34, at 271.
39. U.S. Census, Texas, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/48000.htmi --- report (last
visited Feb. 25, 2010); CIA Fact Sheet, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/gl.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2010).
40. Vladimir Solovyev Kommersant, The President approved the National Security Strategy
of Russia until 2020, KOMMEPCAHTB DAILY, May 14, 2009, available at
http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocslD= 1168827 (last visited Feb. 25, 2010).
41. One source from the Presidential Staff seat who was involved in the work on the
document, stated that the difference between the current strategy and all other documents is that it,
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States and its allies as a "group of leading foreign countries aimed at
achieving overwhelming superiority in the military sphere by unilaterally
forming a global system of missile defense and militarizing near-Earth
,,42space. The policy also reflects an alarming forecast that in the long term
the world will see escalation of the competition for control over energy
resources, which in the Arctic and elsewhere, may devolve into war. "The
attention of international politics will be concentrated on possession of
access to sources of energy resources, including in the Middle East, on the
Barents Sea shelf and other Arctic regions .... At the same time, however,
the document indicates that Russia is ready for the development of
improved relations with NATO and greater strategic partnership with the
United States, but on the basis of "equality and concurring interests.
'A3
In September 2009, President Dmitry Medvedev signed another
Kremlin strategy, which was released by the presidential Security Council
and focused on the Arctic. The State Policy of the Russian Federation in
the Arctic until 2020 states that Russia is strengthening its border guard
forces and plans to create a new military force to protect its interests in the
Arctic region.44 The strategy also indicates the "Arctic Zone of the Russian
Federation" should become the country's "top strategic resource base"
within a decade.45  Russia seeks to use its vast Arctic areas to "satisfy the
requirement of Russia for hydrocarbon resources, aquatic biologic [sic]
resources and other kinds of strategic raw materials." 46 Moscow also is
focused on protecting its Arctic natural environment, to "eliminate" the
ecologic impact of commerce, to ensure the Arctic is seamlessly connected
to the rest of the country's network of information technology and
communications in order to form a single information space, and as a region
"places emphasis not only on the power component [but also] also takes into consideration the rights of
individuals." Id. "So, this concept is quite democratic and liberal," the source noted. "After all, it is
impossible to ensure national security with power methods only." Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. The "Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation" encompasses, fully or partially, "the territory
of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), Murmansk and Arkhangelsk Oblasts, the Krasnoyarsk Kray, the
Nenetskiy, Yamalo-Nenetskiy and Chukotskiy Autonomous Okrugs, that were defined by a decision of
the State Commission for Arctic Affairs under the Council of Ministers of the USSR of 22 April 1989,
as well as the lands and islands indicated in the Resolution of the Presidium of the Central Executive
Committee of the USSR of 15 April 1926 "On the Declaration of the Territories of the USSR of Lands
and Islands Situated in the Arctic Ocean," and the interior sea waters, the territorial seas, the exclusive
economic zone and the continental shelf of the Russian Federation adjacent to the territories, lands and
islands within the limits of which Russia possesses sovereign rights and jurisdictions in accordance with
international law." Presidential Decree, May 12, 2009, No. 537 (Russ.), § 2 [hereinafter No. 537].
45. Id. § 4(a).
46. Id. § 6(a).
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for basic and applied scientific research, especially technology related to
defense and security.
47
Overcoming the geophysical challenges, Russia has developed a much
more extensive Arctic economic and shipping infrastructure than any other
nation, and it also operates numerous ice breakers to support transits
throughout the Northern Sea Route and Northeast Passage. Moreover, most
of the transits across the top of Siberia are in international waters, as Russia
has drawn straight baselines to capture as internal waters only a handful of
narrow and short straits.
Established in the 1930s, the northern routes were used to connect the
frozen north to the rest of the country.48 The infrastructure and port
facilities deteriorated in the 1990s with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the
break-up of the Soviet Union.49 Usage of the routes plummeted. However,
in recent years the Northern Sea Route and Northeast Passage are
experiencing a renaissance, as Russia lavishes attention and resources on its
northern strategy. The routes have tremendous potential to promote the
natural resources sector of the new Russian economy. Most of the rivers in
Siberia flow north to the Arctic, providing the best avenue for moving
goods over long distances. As the climate warms, the rivers and associated
oceanic routes will become even more accessible, both for resource
development and transportation.
The routes have fared prominently in Russia's national economic
development strategy since 2000, and Moscow has more ice breakers than
any nation on Earth.50 Three heavy, nuclear-powered ice breakers are to be
added to the fleet by 2016."' These powerful ships can operate along the
northern coast throughout the entire year. The nation also plans to
construct a variety of ice-strengthened service vessels for offshore port
service and search-and rescue operations.53
Moscow has published comprehensive regulations for navigation along
the Northern Sea Route, which include navigational control, mandatory
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pilotage and required icebreaker escort through the Vilkitskiy Strait, Dmitry
Laptev Strait, the Sannikov Strait, and the Shokalskiy Strait. Most of the
traffic along the Northern Sea Route is Russian-flagged. Most transits are
regional cabotage shipping rather than intercontinental voyages. With the
exception of two German vessels that used the route in the summer of 2009,
the Northern Sea Route had not been transited by a non-Russian ship since
1997. Russia asserts the authority to require all vessels using the route to
pay a fee to support icebreaking, and the charge can be as much as
$100,000 per transit.54  The transit fees and other regulations may be
excessive since they are disconnected from the actual cost of the services
rendered, and therefore are an impermissible impediment to transit passage
through straits used for international navigation.
Some ice-strengthened ships are capable of conducting the transit
without icebreaker support, so requiring ice-breaker assistance appears to be
more about rent-seeking and political control than safety at sea. But in
September 2009, Russia indicated that it was prepared to develop
international cooperation on the Northern Sea Route. Artur Chilingarov, in
a meeting with the Norwegian Barents Secretariat, suggested that Russia
could position an office in Kirkenes." Cooperation on the Northern Sea
Route will become more important as the ice gets thinner, opening a
passage through the route without the aid of ice breakers.
Furthermore, Russia is interested in capitalizing on the Arctic as a
sphere of military security. Moscow seeks to strengthen its ability to
"defend and safeguard the state border of the Russian Federation in the
Arctic Zone," and to use the area to support "essential combat capabilities
of general purpose formations of troops (forces) of the Armed
,,56Forces ....
Finally, the strategy seeks to ensure the Arctic is a sphere of greater
international cooperation, and so far this element has been under-exploited.
Moscow is seeking to build an Arctic security architecture that provides for
conditions of "mutually advantageous" cooperation between the Russian
Federation and other Arctic-bordering states, and "based on international
treaties and agreements to which the Russian Federation is a party." 7
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In contrast to the provocative military exercises and belligerent public
diplomacy, Russia has been remarkably even-tempered about efforts to
maintain peace and adhere to the rule of law in the Arctic Ocean. At a press
conference in Moscow, Russian Foreign Ministry special envoy Anton
Vasilyev stated that any suggestion concerning possible military conflict
over Arctic resources is baseless.58 The "alarmist assessments" about the
potential for war in the Arctic-some of which "reach almost as far as the
World War III in the struggle for Arctic resources," are "excessive and
sometimes provocative."' 9 Vasilyev also stated that issues in the Arctic will
be "solved on the basis of international law."
60
The United States should explore Vasilyev's offer to collaborate more
closely. By working more closely with the Russian Navy, the United States
could promote a stable and peaceful Arctic Ocean. Furthermore,
cooperation would leverage the Russian and U.S. naval forces for expanded
support for freedom of navigation in the Arctic, enjoin Russia in sharing a
greater burden in maritime security operations and develop the rule of law
in the world's fourth largest ocean. Finally, the cooperation in the High
North would be noticed elsewhere, such as China, which is grappling with
how to employ a rapidly growing blue water fleet. The unintended
consequence-think of it as an extra dividend--of accepting the Russian
Navy as an equal partner for peace in the Arctic Ocean might actually be
warmer relations between the two countries.
VI. EXTENDED CONTINENTAL SHELF
Despite the relentless media frenzy over a private Russian miniature
submarine planting a flag on the seabed of the North Pole, Russia is not
making irresponsible claims to the seabed. Under the Law of the Sea
Convention coastal nations may claim sovereignty over the resources of an
extended continental shelf, but not the water column above it, by submitting
convincing bathymetric and geologic data to an international commission
that shows the seabed is a natural extension of the geographic continental
margin.61 Russia has made claims to the resources of the seabed at the
58. Russia says Arctic Military Conflict is Not Possible, DAILY NEWS BULLETIN (Moscow),
Oct. 22, 2008, available at http:l/www.barents.no/russia-wants-northem-sea-route-
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Council) (2009).
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North Pole based on some evidence that the Lomonosov Ridge, an
underwater mountain range, extends from Siberia to the top of the world.
The body that reviews such claims, the Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf, was set up under the Law of the Sea Convention, and it
has asked Russia for additional ocean survey data to support the claim-
which Russia is trying to provide.
Moscow is completing geological studies by 2011 to demonstrate its
claim to the extended continental shelf of the North Pole. In 2001, Russia
was the first nation to submit an extended continental shelf claim to the
Commission, and Russia's assertion that the Lomonosov Ridge projects the
Siberian continental shelf to the North Pole is opposed by Canada and
Denmark. Canada fears submarines from the Russia's Northern Fleet could
be involved in efforts to claim and protect Arctic resources.
Concerning Russia's claim over the continental shelf extending as far
as the North Pole, the spokesman stated that Russia was going through the
process for making such claims under Article 76 of the Law of the Sea
Convention. "Article 76 of the International Convention on the Law of the
Sea only stipulates the sovereignty to explore the seabed and mineral
resources and the exclusive right to use the seabed and mineral resources.
Pipes, cables can be built over this territory no problem, without a permit of
respective nations, this zone is open to navigation," he stated accurately.62
He also acknowledged that even if Russia is allowed to expand the borders
of its continental shelf, it will not mean that Russia will have total
sovereignty over this entire zone. 63 In particular, a continental shelf claim
does not inure additional rights of control over the fishing resources. 64
VII. THE BERING GATE
The Bering Strait is the Pacific gateway to the Arctic Ocean and the
Northwest Passage. The daily maritime border cooperation and routine
security management between the 17th Coast Guard district and the eastern
region of the Federal Border Service of Russia is the most functional
bilateral relationship between the two countries.
The arrangement is also one of the best bilateral security relationships
in the Arctic outside of NATO. The two nations closely coordinate the
management of the Bering Strait under an agreement signed in 1995
between the U.S. Coast Guard and the Federal Border Service of the
62. Moscow Asks to Stop Arctic War Intimidations, DAILY NEWS BULLETIN (Moscow), Oct.
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Russian Federation.65 A 2001 protocol to the pact reached agreement on
operational procedures to more effectively combine maritime law
enforcement in the North Pacific, including search and rescue operations,
protection of 200-mile exclusive economic zones, prevention of terrorism
and smuggling at sea and maritime border security.66  In order to
accomplish these tasks, the two nations developed a Combined Operations
Manual or "playbook" for conducting operations, including cooperative
procedures for command, control and communications, information-
sharing, boarding of suspicious vessels, flight operations and emergency
assistance.67  The two nations exchange personnel and conduct combined
training and operations along the Bering Strait.
VIII. IMPLEMENTING THE COOPERATIVE STRATEGY IN THE ARCTIC OCEAN
The Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Sea Power, which was
signed by the service chiefs of the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard in
2007, suggests climate change may become a potential source of
competition and conflict. 68 "Climate change is gradually opening up the
waters of the Arctic, not only to new resource development, but also to new
shipping routes that may reshape the global transport system,' ' 69 the strategy
states. "While these developments offer opportunities for growth, they are
potential sources of competition and conflict for access and natural
resources."
70
But the Russian Navy is not going to go away and it is far more
favorable to co-opt the force than resist it. Doing so leverages the military
and political power of Russia to achieve the goals of the Cooperative
Strategy-increasing the rule of law in the oceans. If the Russian Navy can
successfully be incorporated into the global security paradigm, then an
entirely new and powerful capability is brought on line to contribute to
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maritime security constabulary operations, humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief and the assertion of freedom of navigation challenges. Such
close coordination for maritime security cooperation also presents the
navies of the United States and other countries with the opportunity to share
best practices, present our perspective on how to best strengthen conflict
avoidance at sea and broaden maritime regional stability. No nation can do
it alone, and Russia could be a great force multiplier.
Building on Russia's renewed interest in the oceans and yearning for
recognition, the United States and the other major maritime powers should
seriously operationalize the Cooperative Strategy in its Arctic relationship
with Russia. Going beyond diplomatic engagement with Moscow, the
United States should seek to conduct exercises and mission planning for
responsible multinational patrols in critical areas such as the Arctic Ocean.
IX. LEVERAGING THE INCIDENTS AT SEA AGREEMENT
In the late 1960s, there were several incidents between forces of the
U.S. Navy and the Soviet Navy. These included planes of the two nations
passing near one another, ships bumping one another, and both ships and
aircraft making threatening movements against those of the other side. In
March 1968 the United States proposed talks on preventing such incidents
from becoming more serious. The Soviet Union accepted the invitation in
November 1970, and the talks were conducted in two rounds--October 1,
1971, in Moscow and May 17, 1972, in Washington, D.C. The "Incidents
at Sea" (INCSEA) agreement was signed by Secretary of the Navy John
Warner and Soviet Admiral Sergei Gorshkov during the Moscow summit
meeting in 1972.
One way to quickly reach this level of cooperation would be for the
United States to refashion its approach to the 1NCSEA arrangement.
INCSEA, which has atrophied over the last two decades and has been
reduced to a mechanism for Sixth Fleet staff talks and arranging port
visits-confined to the European environs. But when it was originally
conceived, the INCSEA agreement had global application. The treaty was
signed by the Secretary of the Navy years before the Goldwater-Nichols
defense transformation stripped the Chief of Naval Operations of his role as
the worldwide operational commander of naval forces. Goldwater-Nichols
successfully reduced service parochialism, yet vestiges such as INCSEA
remain in the pocket of regional naval commanders rather than Pentagon
leadership with a global perspective.
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